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I. INTRODUCTION
No state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."1 Exactly how equal protection applies to various situations
is not always clear.2 In several states, including West Virginia, doctors and in-
surance companies have pushed for medical malpractice reform in response to a
perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis, and many states have been suc-
cessful in instituting reforms.3 These reforms often come in the form of a cap
on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice awards. 4 Noneconomic dam-
ages are defined as those "losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering,
mental anguish and grief."5 They include losses not in the form of a concrete
medical bill, like loss of fertility, severe disfigurement and the death of a child,
adult, or senior citizen.6 Twenty-seven states currently cap noneconomic dam-
ages.7 The West Virginia Legislature had tackled tort reform once before in
1986, resulting in a $1,000,000 cap on noneconomic damages.8 After intense
lobbying by doctors, 9 the cap was reduced to $250,000 in 2003.10 Other states
have been quick to follow suit." The new legislation was "conceived and exe-
cuted in the belief that tort reform ... will stabilize the medical professional
I U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601
(14th ed. 2001).
3 Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Ac-
tions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REv. 417, 431 n.61
(2004).
4 Id. at 431-58.
5 Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 882 (W. Va. 1991).
6 FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, How INSURANCE REFORM LOWERED
DOCTORS' MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES IN CALIFORNIA AND How MALPRACTICE CAPS FAILED 3
(Feb. 10, 2003), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/rp/1008.pdf.
7 Marguerite Higgins, Medical Services Rise with Suit Limits, WASH. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at
CI0.
8 See Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 881-82.
9 See Stephanie Mencimer, Malpractice Makes Perfect: How the GOP Milks a Bogus Doc-
tors' Insurance Crisis, 35 WASH. MONTHLY 25 (2003). See also Lawrence Messina, The Price of
Malpractice: W. Va. 's Medical Malpractice Debate- Medical assoc., insurance firm make secret
deal, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 2001, at 2A. Messina reports that Medical Assurance, a
malpractice insurance company, secretly paid the state medical association an estimated $690,000
since 1995. The agreement required association members to lobby members of the West Virginia
Legislature. In exchange, association members could reap a share of Medical Assurance's $208
million annual profits.
10 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2004).
11 See Wayne J. Guglielmo, Seeds of the Crisis: Multiple factors-history shows-have con-
tributed to the current situation, 82 MED. ECON. 22, 26 (2005).
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liability insurance market in West Virginia, and thereby help to assure the avail-
ability of affordable insurance coverage."1 2 These new reforms were passed
without knowledge of their effects or whether the caps would be effective in
alleviating the insurance crisis. 13 But what do these caps mean for West Vir-
ginia citizens and patrons of healthcare systems?
The current insurance crisis has threatened some citizens' access to
quality healthcare. 14 A variety of complex factors affect the access to healthcare
in a given area, and the cost of malpractice insurance for doctors is included in
that equation.' 5 Although malpractice claims are only one factor affecting in-
surance rates,' 6 reducing frivolous lawsuits has been the major focus of re-
forms. 17 These reforms capping noneconomic damages arbitrarily discriminate
between similarly situated groups of people, and the caps deny certain victims
of medical malpractice a full recovery for their injuries. 18 Denying those vic-
tims a full recovery is considered permissible and necessary to achieve benefits
for the rest of society.' 9 It raises the question of whether caps violate those vic-
tims' right to equal protection. Are the states' interests substantial enough to
override those equal protection claims? State courts that have examined damage
caps are split on the issue.20 Caps on noneconomic damages may violate equal
protection in two ways: first, victims of a medical malpractice tort are subject to
12 W. VA. HOSPITAL Assoc., SUMMARY OF THE WEST VIRGINIA MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY REFORM ACT 6, (March 12, 2003), available at http://www.wvha.com/hb2l22/final%
20summary %202122.pdf.
13 See infra notes 146-244 and accompanying text.
14 Glassman, supra note 3, at 417 (noting the AMA has warned some patients had to leave
their state to receive urgent care and that pregnant women have difficulty finding an obstetrician).
15 U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 4 (2003).
16 Id.
17 See Glassman, supra note 3, at 431, 432-58. Glassman examines all 50 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia and discusses the reform actions taken by each, if any. Id.
18 See Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406, 417-18 (W. Va. 2001) (McGraw, J., dissenting); id.
at 413 (W. Va. 2001) (Starcher, J., dissenting). See also Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H.
1980) (per curiam); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (11. 1976), Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
19 See Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 887 (W. Va. 1991).
20 Courts in West Virginia, California, and Wisconsin have upheld the constitutionality of
damage caps on noneconomic damages. See Robinson, 414 S.E.2d 877 (upholding a $1,000,000
cap on noneconomic damages); Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (ap-
proving the constitutionality of a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages); Maurin v. Hall, 682
N.W.2d 866 (Wis. 2004) (upholding dual statutes limiting damages for either wrongful death or
survival of medical malpractice). Courts in Illinois, North Dakota, and Texas have ruled that caps
are unconstitutional. See Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741 (striking down a law limiting noneconomic
damages to $500,000); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135 (invalidating a $300,000 cap on all damages);
Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692 (ruling unconstitutional a $500,000 cap on damages). But see TEx. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. § 74.301 (2004). In 2003, the Texas Legislature passed a statute limiting the
amount of noneconomic damages to $250,000. Id.
20061
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21a cap, whereas victims of other torts are not subject to any caps. Some argue
that these caps are necessary to maintain access to quality care.22 Second, the
caps distinguish among victims of medical malpractice; it more heavily burdens
the catastrophically injured23 and those without economic damages, such as
housewives, the elderly, and children. 24
The caps present another problem, which is potentially more serious.
Some victims are finding it difficult to obtain legal representation, and in effect
they are denied any recovery at all. Because the new legislation went into
effect recently, and many of the medical malpractice cases currently being liti-
gated are ones filed before July 1, 2003, the full effect of the caps on the number
of cases has not yet been realized.26
27Although the reforms passed in 2003 contained several provisions, this
article focuses on § 55-7B-8 of the West Virginia Code, which established a
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages. This article seeks to explain the re-
vised West Virginia statute and why altering the statute was believed imperative
to the survival of doctors in the state. An overview of equal protection is fol-
lowed by decisions in West Virginia and other states on the constitutionality of
limitations on noneconomic damages. After discussion of whether caps will
work and if a malpractice insurance "crisis" really exists, the likelihood of dam-
age caps denying victims' ability to secure representation and gain access to
court is explored.
21 Carson, 424 A.2d at 830.
22 See Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 880; Fein, 695 P.2d at 680.
23 See Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 417 (McGraw, J., dissenting). See also Carson, 424 A.2d at 830.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found caps unconstitutional because the law singled out
victims of medical negligence and treated them differently than victims of other types of negli-
gence Id. "The medical malpractice statute establishes several classifications. First, it confers
certain benefits on tortfeasors who are health care providers that are not afforded to other tortfea-
sors. Conversely, it distinguishes between those tort claimants whose injuries were caused by
medical malpractice and all other tort claimants. The statute also distinguishes between medical
malpractice victims whose noneconomic loss exceeds $ 250,000 and those whose noneconomic
loss is $ 250,000 or less ... ." Id. These are the same types of classifications made by W. VA.
CODE § 55-7B-8 (2004).
24 Mark Donald, Access Denied: Does Tort Reform Close Courthouse Doors to Those Who
Can Least Afford It?, TEXAS LAWYER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 1.
25 See infra notes 204-39 and accompanying text.
26 Interview with Paul T. Farrell, Jr., Member, Wilson, Frame, Benninger, Farrell & Metheney
in Morgantown, W. Va. (Jan. 17, 2005).
27 See W. VA. HosPrAL Assoc., supra note 12, at 1. The reforms also abolished joint and
several liability, eliminated the collateral source rule, provided for a $500,000 cap for emergency
services provided at trauma centers, altered the qualifications for expert witnesses, raised the
standard of proof on the "loss of chance" theory, limited third-party actions, altered the "ostensi-
ble agency" theory of negligence, and established a patient compensation fund. Id.
[Vol. 108
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II. How THE LAW HAS CHANGED IN WEST VIRGINIA
A. The Reforms in 1986 Capped Damages at $1,000,000
In response to rising insurance premiums for doctors, the West Virginia
Legislature enacted the Medical Professional Liability Act in 1986.28 One pro-
vision of that Act, Section 55-7B-8, capped noneconomic damages at one mil-
lion dollars. 29 The text of the statute read: "In any medical professional liability
action brought against a health care provider, the maximum amount recoverable
as damages for noneconomic loss shall not exceed one million dollars and the
jury may be so instructed., 30 The constitutionality of this provision was chal-
lenged and upheld twice.
31
The law was enacted to "encourage and facilitate" the availability of
premium health care services to the citizens of West Virginia.32 The legislature
found that premiums for medical malpractice insurance had climbed dramati-
cally and that "the nature and extent of coverage concomitantly has diminished,
to the detriment of the inured and health care providers. 33 Therefore, the legis-
lature thought it necessary to implement reforms, including a $1,000,000 cap on
noneconomic damages. 34
B. The 2003 Reform Reduced the Cap to $250,000
Although West Virginia already had a cap on noneconomic damages, by
2002, doctors were actively advocating reducing the cap to $250,000. 3' The
West Virginia Legislature and West Virginia Governor Bob Wise later enacted
legislation to establish a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases.36 On March 5, 2003, the West Virginia Legislature passed
House Bill 2122, which was a substantial overhaul of West Virginia's medical
liability statutes.38 The bill aimed to ensure "quality patient care; provide a fair
28 Jill Oliverio, To Cap or Not to Cap Damage Awards: That is the Constitutional Question,
91 W. VA. L. REV. 519, 538 (1989).
29 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2000).
30 Id.
31 See infra notes 69-101 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges to W. VA. CODE §
55-7B-8).
32 Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 881 (1991).
33 Id.
34 See id. at 881-82.
35 Therese Smith Cox, Candidates Warm to Tort Reform: Doctors Gaining Support for
Change of Legal System, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 9, 2002, at P7A.
36 Michael Romano, To Cap or Not to Cap; Medical Community Lobbies for Limits on None-
conomic Damages, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 24, 2003, at 10.
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and prompt means of resolving medical liability claims; and provide a liability
environment comparable to, if not greater than, that of other states in the na-
tion. 39
The new Medical Professional Liability Act caps noneconomic damages
at $250,000.40 However, there are three instances where the cap may be ex-
tended to $500,000: (1) wrongful death; (2) permanent and substantial physical
deformity or loss of use of limb or loss of a bodily organ system; and (3) per-
manent physical or mental functional injuries that permanently prevent the in-
jured person from being independently able to care for himself and perform life
sustaining activities. 4' The caps remain in place regardless of the number of
plaintiffs or defendants. 42 Also, the amount of the caps are adjusted yearly ac-
cording to the consumer price index.4 3 However, these inflationary increases
are also restricted, eventually "cap[ping] out" at $350,000 in most cases and
$750,000 in the three instances listed above .44
III. SECTION 55-7B-8 MAY POSE AN EQUAL PROTECTION PROBLEM
A. What is Equal Protection?
Equal protection requires that the government treat a person or class of
persons the same as it treats others in similar circumstances.45 Although the
government regularly makes distinctions in legislation, the government cannot
treat similarly situated persons differently.46 For example, the government can-
not prohibit the sale of beer to 18-20 year-old males, while simultaneously per-
mitting 18-20 year-old females to purchase beer.4 7 In modem constitutional
jurisprudence, equal protection means that if legislation divides people into
classes, the division must be substantially related to the achievement of a legiti-
mate government objective.48 Legislation affecting a fundamental right, such as
the right to vote, or engaging a suspect classification, such as race, will be un-
constitutional unless it survives strict scrutiny.49 "In the broadest view, the





43 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2004).
44 See W. VA. HOSPITAL Assoc., supra note 12, at 3.
45 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (7th ed. 2000).
46 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 601.
47 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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determine [how] its professed commitment to the proposition that 'all men are
created equal"' should function in practice.5 °
Equal protection issues are generally decided using one of three levels
of analysis: strict scrutiny, mere rationality, and heightened scrutiny. 51 First,
strict scrutiny applies in situations where there exists a suspect classification or
where the governmental action impacts fundamental rights or interests.52 Racial
classifications are considered to be a suspect class, while fundamental rights and
interests subject to scrict scrutiny include voting, criminal appeals, and the right
to interstate travel.53
The lowest standard of review, mere rationality, requires courts to de-
termine whether a classification bears "some rational relationship to a legitimate
state end and [it] will be set aside as violative of the Equal Protection Clause
only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. '54 If there
exists "any reasonably conceivable set of facts that could provide a rational ba-
sis for the classification[,]" it will be upheld. 55 Finally, heightened scrutiny, or
intermediate scrutiny, applies to classifications involving sex, alienage, and
illegitimacy. 56 Under this test, classifications "must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those ob-
jectives. 57 This standard is:
"intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends
must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny, and need be
merely "legitimate" under rationality review, "important" ob-
jectives are required here; and where means must be "neces-
sary" under strict scrutiny, and merely "rationally related" un-
der rationality review, they must be "substantially related" to
survive the "intermediate" level of review.
58
B. How does Equal Protection Apply to Tort Victims?
Generally, the question of whether equal protection has been violated
arises when a state grants rights to engage in an activity to a particular class of
50 Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, Equal Protection Clause, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Equal-protection#Notes (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
51 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 601-04.
52 Id. at 603.
53 Id.
54 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
55 FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
56 SuLLIvAN & GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 603.
57 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
58 SuLLivAN & GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 604.
2006]
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individuals yet denies other individuals the same right.59 Medical malpractice
caps distinguish among tort victims; medical malpractice victims are subject to
different restrictions than auto accident victims, for example. Medical malprac-
tice plaintiffs are limited in their recovery while plaintiffs in other torts may
recover complete compensation for their injuries.6° Furthermore, the caps dis-
criminate among medical malpractice victims by making it more difficult for the
catastrophically injured patients to make a full recovery.61
Medical malpractice victims and tort victims in general are not members
of a suspect class, so the constitutionality of caps is not decided using strict
scrutiny.62 Instead, courts often examine the purpose of the legislation and de-
termine its constitutionality, 63 using either heightened scrutiny 64 or mere ration-
ality.65 West Virginia has used mere rationality in determining the constitution-
ality of damage caps.66 Because the right to bring a tort action is economically
based, it is not a fundamental right for state constitutional equal protection pur-
poses.67
IV. COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER CAPS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION
A. The $1 million cap was upheld in West Virginia
The constitutionality of the million dollar cap was first examined in
Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center.68 Robinson involved an infant
who suffered permanent and total brain damage during his delivery.69 At the
time of this case, the controlling statute limited noneconomic losses to one mil-
59 Legal Information Institute, Equal Protection: An Overview, http://www.law.comell.edu/
topics/equal-protection.html (last visited on Feb. 13, 2006).
60 Oliverio, supra note 28, at 521.
61 Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406,413 (W. Va. 2001) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
62 Oliverio, supra note 28, at 522.
63 See Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 881-82 (W. Va. 1991); Wright
v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741, 743 (Ill. 1976); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 126-27 (N.D. 1978).
64 Oliverio, supra note 28, at 523 n.34 (citing Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135); Johnson v. St.
Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980)).
65 Oliverio, supra note 28, at 523 (citing Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 670
(Cal. 1985)); Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 462 So.2d 149 (La. 1985); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med.
Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio 1976); Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App. 1984);
Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781
(W.D. Va. 1986)).
66 See Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 883; Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 410.
67 Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 885-86 (citing Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408 S.E.2d
634, 644 (W. Va. 1991); Gibson v. W. Va. Dep't of Highways, 406 S.E.2d 440, 444 (W. Va.
1991)).
68 Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 880.
69 Id. at 881.
[Vol. 108
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lion dollars. Noneconomic damages include pain, suffering, grief, and mental
suffering., 70 In addition to awards for future lost earnings and nursing care, the
jury awarded $2,500,000 for past, present, and future loss of enjoyment of life
and other noneconomic damages; the jury also awarded $1,000,000 each to the
infant's mother and father for noneconomic damages. Following an appeal by
the doctor, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the cap was
constitutional and reduced the award for noneconomic damages to $1,000,000
to be shared by the three individuals. 71 The court reasoned that the caps were
rationally related to a legitimate state interest of reducing doctors' insurance
premiums, and upheld the caps.72
Ten years later, the court again examined the constitutionality of the
$1,000,000 cap in Verba v. Ghaphery.73 The court used a rational basis test to
determine whether a statute violates equal protection.74 When a statute involves
economic rights, the court examines whether the classification is a "rational one
based on social, economic, historic or geographic factors, whether it bears a
reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose, and whether all per-
sons within the class are treated equally." If the classification is rational and
forms a reasonable relationship, the statute does not violate Section 10, Article
III of the West Virginia Constitution,75 which encompasses the equal protection
clause. 76 However, the court relied on stare decisis to reaffirm the constitution-
ality of the caps without thoroughly applying the test it just enumerated.77 The
court does address the aims of the legislature and whether the law serves a le-
gitimate governmental purpose, but it does not examine whether all persons
78within the class are treated equally. It is unclear how the court rationalizes and
justifies the fact that the cap distinguishes between medical malpractice victims
and other tort victims, and between mildly injured victims and catastrophically
injured victims.
70 Id. at 882.
71 Id. at 881.
72 Id. at 887.
73 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001).
74 Id. at 410.
75 Id. (citing Atchinson v. Erwin, Syl. Pt. 7, 302 S.E.2d 78 (W. Va. 1983)).
76 W. VA. CONST., art. III, § 10. See also Israel v. W. Va. Secondary Activities Comm'n, 388
S.E.2d 480, 487 (W. Va. 1989).
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1. Justices Starcher and McGraw Argue Against the Constitution-
ality of the Caps
Justice Larry V. Starcher and Chief Justice Warren McGraw both filed
dissenting opinions in Verba v. Ghaphery.7 9 In their opinions, both believed the
statute arbitrarily and unfairly discriminated among similarly situated people. 80
Justice Starcher believes the $1,000,000 cap is an obvious violation of
equal protection in the West Virginia Constitution. 8  The discriminatory and
arbitrary statute treats similarly situated persons differently and unfairly, and
often deprives catastrophically injured plaintiffs a remedy under the law. 82 "A
plaintiff who is injured by the negligence of anyone other than a 'health care
provider' can collect his or her full damages as awarded by a jury--but a plain-
tiff who is injured by the negligence of a 'health care provider' cannot.
' 83
It is also not rational for the legislature to burden a specific class of citi-
zens with an incomplete recovery when there are other factors that contribute to
malpractice insurance rates, Justice Starcher argues.84 Because of that, it is irra-
tional to saddle severely injured plaintiffs with the duty of "reducing, by some
immeasurable amount, all doctors' medical malpractice insurance premiums,
85
especially because malpractice insurance is influenced by a variety of factors.86
The burden imposed on the catastrophically injured victim is too great and is in
violation of equal protection.87
Justice McGraw agrees that the caps violate equal protection because
the caps deny a full recovery to those most egregiously injured.88 He empha-
sizes that damage caps force the most severely injured victims to be "singled out
to pay for social relief to medical tortfeasors and their insurers." 89 That hardship
is borne most heavily by the most severely maltreated and, thus, most deserving
79 Id. at 413, 417.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 413 (Starcher, J., dissenting).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 414. See also State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062,
1092 (Ohio 1999) (finding cap on damages unconstitutional). "'It is irrational and arbitrary to
impose the cost of the intended benefit to the general public solely upon a class consisting of those
most severely injured by medical malpractice' and that any cap on damages was 'unconstitutional
because it does not bear a real and substantial relation to public health or welfare and further be-
cause it is unreasonable and arbitrary."' Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 415.
85 Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 414.
86 See infra notes 146-208 and accompanying text.
87 Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 415.
88 Id. See also Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
89 Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 418 (quoting Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 689-
90 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 108
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of relief.90 Both Justice Starcher and McGraw echo other courts' reasoning that
has stricken damage caps as unconstitutional. 9' "Unlike the less severely in-
jured, who receive full and just compensation, the catastrophically injured vic-
tim of medical malpractice is denied any expectation of compensation beyond
the statutory limit. '92 The 2003 reforms highlight this distinction even further.
Those who have damages of less than $250,000 are fully compensated for their
injuries, while victims who sustain damages in excess of $250,000 cannot
achieve a complete recovery.
93
2. The Court Indicates a Lower Cap Might be Unconstitutional
The court in Robinson emphasized that its decision upholding the con-
stitutionality of the cap was specifically limited to the $1,000,000 cap; its judg-
ment is not one affirming the constitutionality of any and all caps on none-
conomic damages. 94 Any modifications by the legislature may cause the cap to
be unconstitutional.95 Reducing noneconomic damages at some point to a lesser
cap "'would be manifestly so insufficient as to become a denial of justice[,]'
under ... the state constitutional equal protection or 'certain remedy' provi-
sions., 96 This language suggests that the 2003 reforms will not withstand a con-
stitutional challenge because of the reforms' effects on citizens' rights.97
B. Other States Examine Caps on Damages
Several states have heard cases challenging caps on noneconomic dam-
ages and are divided over whether damage caps are constitutional 98 or unconsti-
tutional.99 The following is a sample of three states.
90 Id.
91 See Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (I11. 1976) (striking down a
law limiting noneconomic damages to $500,000); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D.
1978) (invalidating a $300,000 cap on all damages); Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)
(ruling unconstitutional a $500,000 cap on damages).
92 Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 418.
93 See id.
94 Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 887 (W. Va. 1991).
95 Id.
96 Id. (citing Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 700 (Gonzales, J., dissenting)).
97 See infra notes 208-244 and accompanying text.
98 See Robinson, 414 S.E.2d 877 (upholding a $1,000,000 cap on noneconomic damages); Fein
v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (approving the constitutionality of a
$250,000 limit on noneconomic damages); Maurin v. Hall, 682 N.W.2d 866 (Wis. 2004) (uphold-
ing dual statutes limiting damages for either wrongful death or survival of medical malpractice).
99 See Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. 1976) (striking down a
law limiting noneconomic damages to $500,000); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D.
1978) (invalidating a $300,000 cap on all damages); Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)
(ruling unconstitutional a $500,000 cap on damages).
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1. Illinois finds a $500,000 cap unconstitutional
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Wright v. Central Du Page
Hospital, struck down a statute limiting recovery in malpractice cases to
$500,000.'O° The plaintiffs argued that the most seriously injured victims are
unreasonably discriminated against, whereas the moderately injured are able to
make a full recovery.' 0 ' In response, the defendants posit, "that such unequal
treatment is necessary to deal with what they describe as the 'medical malprac-
tice crisis."",10 2 The defendants further argued that there is a "societal quid pro
quo," where some malpractice victims' recoveries are limited, but society bene-
fits in return through lower insurance premiums and medical care costs for all
health care patrons. 10 3 However, the court found that the $500,000 limit only in
medical malpractice actions was arbitrary and in violation of the Illinois Consti-
tution. °4 However, in late August, 2005, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich
signed into law a bill which again caps at $500,000 for physicians and
$1,000,000 for hospitals. 10 5 The constitutionality of this new law is expected to
be challenged soon.1°6
2. North Dakota strikes down a $300,000 cap on all damages
The statute in question in Arneson v. Olson'0 7 imposed a $300,000 cap
on damages arising from any one occurrence. 0 8 This cap limited total damages,
not only noneconomic damages. 1°9 The statute enumerated a number of pur-
poses, including assuring the availability of medical services at a reasonable
cost, the elimination of the expense involved with non-meritorious claims, pro-
viding ample compensation for meritorious claims, and encouraging doctors to
enter into practice and remain in North Dakota.11 0
However, the court did not believe that the aims of the legislation out-
weighed the burdens imposed on malpractice victims."' The limitation does not
100 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).
101 Id. at 741.
102 Id. (citing Hall v. Gillins, 147 N.E.2d 352 (I11. 958); Cunningham v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d
153 (I11. 961)).
103 Id. at 742.
104 Id. at 743.
105 See Christi Parsons, Trial Lawyers Target Cap on Malpractice, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2005,
at Cl.
106 Id.
107 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
108 Id. at 128.
109 Id. at 135.
110 Id.
"I Id. at 135-36.
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provide for a full recovery for those victims with meritorious claims, especially
the most grievously injured patients.'l 12 As the court notes, a seriously injured
patient's expenses for his or her life expectancy may well exceed $300,000.'3
Moreover, the limitation does nothing to eliminate the filing of non-meritorious
claims.
1 14
North Dakota courts may be deciding the constitutionality of damage
caps once again. The state has again limited the amount of damages awarded to
a plaintiff."l 5 In 1996,116 North Dakota established a $500,000 cap on non-
economic damages."i7 Its constitutionality has not yet been challenged.
3. California upholds a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages
In 1985, California's Supreme Court held that the state's $250,000 cap
on noneconomic damages was not in violation of equal protection. 1 8 Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group involved a man who believed his heart condition
was not timely diagnosed, and that caused him to suffer additional injuries." 9
Fein argued that the caps impermissibly distinguished among tort victims, deny-
ing a complete recovery to certain malpractice victims. 20 In denying his equal
protection challenge, the court reasoned that the malpractice "insurance 'crisis"'
was a compelling reason for the legislature to draw the distinction.'
2 '
West Virginia has yet to decide whether the 2003 reforms are constitu-
tional. Certain aspects of the 2003 legislation have already been challenged,1
22
112 Id. at 135.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 135-36.
115 See Guglielmo, supra note I1, at 22.
116 Id.
17 N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (2003).
118 Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 682 (Cal. 1985).
119 Id. at 670.
120 Id. at 682.
121 Id. at 683; Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990); Franklin v.
Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989). Note, however, that the Kansas and
Maryland statutes cap noneconomic damages in any tort action, not strictly medical malpractice
actions. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02(b) (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108
(2004).
122 Brief of Amici Curiae The Association of Trial Lawyers of America West Virginia Trial
Lawyers Association, Boggs v. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 609 S.E.2d 917 (W.Va. 2004)
(No. 31757). One aspect of H.B. 2122 is that the reforms were made retroactive. See Boggs, 609
S.E.2d at 920. Malpractice claims had to be filed by July 1, 2003, to be covered under the 1986
version of the law. See id. In effect, there is a gap of malpractice incidents that occurred when
the old law was still in effect (before July 1, 2003), but because the reform was made retroactive,
those individuals are forced to file under the 2003 version of W. Va. Code § 55-7B-8. Id. In the
Boggs case, the court was urged to examine the constitutionality of the Medical Professional Li-
2006]
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but the court has not ruled on the constitutionality of the modified Medical Pro-
fessional Liability Act. 123 Whereas many states have struck down limitations on
jury awards, 124 other states uncover no constitutional problems with damage
caps. 25 Because there are no clear guidelines, it is unclear how West Virginia
courts might decide this issue; from the language in Robinson, there are indica-
tions the cap would not be upheld.1 26 Because Robinson and Verba were de-
cided using rational basis review, the court will likely do the same in the future.
As long as the classification bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state
goal and is rationally related to achieving that goal, the limitation on none-
conomic damages will be upheld. 27 However, it is clear that malpractice caps
do make distinctions among tort victims and among medical malpractice vic-
tims, and might deny certain victims a full recovery. The question now be-
comes whether the legislation actually achieves its stated goals, and if so, are
those goals compelling enough for certain members of our society to bear the
burden of incomplete recovery? Conversely, if the legislation does not achieve
its stated goals, then the court should strike down the statute as unconstitutional.
V. WHAT PROMPTED CHANGES IN THE LAW?
During the past few years, West Virginia physicians encouraged the leg-
islature to undertake tort reform. 28 Those lobbying efforts first resulted in es-
tablishing a method to eliminate the filing of non-meritorious claims. 29 Since
2001, attorneys have been required to serve defendants with a certificate of
merit containing an expert's opinion that the standard of care was breached. 30
Although various attorneys believed there were not many frivolous cases to be-
ability Act, but declined to do so. Id. at 921. Boggs involved a clerical error causing Boggs's
claim to fall under the $250,000 instead of the $1,000,000 cap. Id.
123 Id. at 921 n.5 ("We specifically do not reach the issue of the MPLA's constitutionality, as
such an analysis is not necessary to reach a decision in this case.").
124 See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, (N.H. 1980); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687
(Tex. 1988); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976); Arneson v. Olson,
270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
125 See Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
126 See Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 887 (W. Va. 1991). "We
emphasize at this point that our holding that the statutory 'cap' at issue is reasonable is limited to
the particular $1,000,000 'cap' before us." Id. "'Any modification the legislature [would] make
is subject to being stricken as unconstitutional. A reduction of non[economic] damages to a lesser
cap at some point would be manifestly so insufficient as to become a denial of justice[,]' under,
for example, the state constitutional equal protection or 'certain remedy' provisions." Id. at 887
(quoting Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687, 700 (Tex. 1988) (Gonzales, J. dissenting)).
127 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying tex-.
128 Cox, supra note 35.
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gin with,13 ' the statute filtered any cases that were not credible. 32 Because the
certificate of merit filters non-meritorious claims, the noneconomic cap in West
Virginia affects only those victims whose claims have merit.
133
The certificate of merit screening provision was just the first stage of re-
form. Governor Bob Wise saw more extensive tort reform as a way to curb
escalating malpractice insurance rates and established a task force to study the
issue.' 34  Several physicians claimed that medical malpractice insurance was
simply too expensive, and it was causing them to leave the state.135 Many doc-
tors faced a 35 percent rate increase in 2001,136 and two dozen surgeons went on
strike in 2002 at Wheeling Hospital.137 A culmination of these and other events
created a favorable climate for doctors to seek tort reform.1
38
Physicians began lobbying for a $250,000 limit on "noneconomic dam-
ages, limiting attorney fees, informing juries about other sources of payment to
the plaintiff, and other changes."' 139  These pleas for tort reform resonate
throughout the nation. 140 The theory behind the reforms is that if doctors' liabil-
ity is limited, then the malpractice insurance rates will be more predictable and
remain at an affordable level, thereby retaining doctors in the state and attracting
other doctors to practice here.'
41
Retaining talented physicians in West Virginia and attracting other phy-
sicians to practice here is an important component of providing quality health-
care to the citizens of this state. 142 However, the new law was enacted without
131 Telephone Interview with Michael J. Romano, General Partner, Romano & Miley (Jan. 12,
2005); Interview with Paul T. Farrell, Jr., supra note 26; Telephone Interview with William S.
Druckman, Senior Partner, The Law Offices of William S. Druckman (Jan. 24, 2005).
132 Id. But see Telephone Interview with Don R. Sensabaugh, Jr., Member, Flaherty, Sensa-
baugh & Bonasso (Jan. 18, 2005). Mr. Sensabaugh notes the majority of recent medical malprac-
tice cases that have ended in a verdict for the defense as evidence of frivolous cases still making it
to trial. Id.
133 Interview with Paul T. Farrell, Jr., supra note 26; Telephone Interview with James G. Bor-
das, III, Member, Bordas & Bordas (Feb. 8, 2005).
134 See W. VA. HOSPITAL Assoc., supra note 12, at 1.
135 See Cox, supra note 35.
136 Martha Leonard, Threat of suits frightens doctors Specialists hard to attract to state, CAMC
official says, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Jan. 25, 2001, at IC.
137 See Mencimer, supra note 9.
138 For a good discussion of events and the climate in West Virginia before the reforms were
passed in 2003, see Mencimer, supra note 9. Mencimer discusses the actions of several doctors
and lobbying groups in arguing for tort reform, as well as questioning whether the crisis was as
severe as the insurance companies stated. Id.
139 Cox, supra note 35.
140 See Guglielmo, supra note 11, at 22.
141 See Oliverio, supra note 28, at 542.
142 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING
PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE 15 (2003).
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any guarantee from the malpractice insurance companies that they would reduce
and stabilize their rates. 
143
A. The Insurance Crisis is not the Result of Frivolous Lawsuits
The urgency for medical malpractice reform has recently reached na-
tional prominence.44 President Bush has made malpractice reform a top prior-
ity for his second term, and he is urging Congress to pass a national cap on
damages. 145 Arguing that large jury awards are forcing doctors to close their
businesses and are driving up personal health insurance costs, President Bush is
pushing for a $250,000 cap. 146 "'Lawyers are filing baseless suits against hospi-
tals and doctors, that's just a plain fact,' Bush said. 'They are doing it for a sim-
ple reason - they know the medical liability system is tilted in their favor.
' '" 147
With the media consistently criticizing large jury awards and baseless lawsuits,
one cannot help but believe there is a proliferation of frivolous lawsuits spurring
a pressing need for tort reform. But do the facts show that there is a malpractice
insurance crisis?
The medical lobby insists out of control jury verdicts are the cause of
rising insurance rates. 148 Instead, a variety of factors has influenced the rise in
medical malpractice premiums: "[i]nsurers' losses, declines in investment in-
come, a less competitive climate, and climbing reinsurance rates . . . .,,149 Al-
143 See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2003). See also Carol M. Ostrom, Insurer offers premium cut
for cap; Physicians Insurance seeks trade for limit on jury awards, THE SEATTLE TIMES, February
5, 2004, at B2. Washington state's largest medical malpractice insurer "promised state lawmakers
[ J that it would reduce premiums at least 10 percent if legislators approved a $250,000 cap on
jury awards for pain and suffering." Id. But see Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights,
Washington Malpractice Rates Drop Without Damage Cap; State's Largest Insurer More Profit-
able Than Ever, Jan. 11, 2005, http://www.consumerwatchdog.net/insurance/pr/pr00481 1.php3
("Physicians Insurance, Washington State's largest medical malpractice insurer, announced a
7.7% decrease in physicians' rates for 2005 and higher profits than the company has seen in a
decade, despite the fact that the state has not passed the malpractice cap insurance companies and
doctors insist is necessary to address rising premiums.").
W4 See Guglielmo, supra note 11, at 22.
145 Nedra Pickier, Bush Continues Push for Jury Award Limits, Jan. 5, 2005,
http://www.lexisone.com/news/ap/ap0I0505b.html; Julie Rovner, Bush Campaign Focuses on
Malpractice Reform (NPR broadcast Oct. 11, 2004).
146 See Pickier, supra note 145.
147 Id.
148 PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONG. WATCH, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS: CHALLENGING THE MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS OF THE DOCTOR's LOBBY 6 (Jan. 2003). But see Numbers, TIME, July 18, 2005, at 21.
Time magazine noted some interesting statistics on the financial status of 15 top medical malprac-
tice insurance companies: "5.7%: Increase in medical-malpractice payouts by 15 leading insur-
ance companies from 2000 to 2004 ... 120%: Increase in the net premiums collected by those 15
companies during that same period." Id. These statistics seem to support the argument that mal-
practice cases are not responsible for the dramatic rise in malpractice insurance rates. See infra
notes 149-70 and accompanying text.
149 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15.
[Vol. 108
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 14
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss3/14
AN EXTREME RESPONSE OR A NECESSARY REFORM?
though many doctors and defense attorneys condemn the proliferation of frivo-
lous lawsuits as the cause of the insurance crisis,' 50 medical mistakes are more
prevalent than society may believe. 15' In the United States, an estimated 44,000
to 98,000 people die each year from preventable medical errors. 15 2 Only about
1.5 percent of these mistakes results in a malpractice claim being filed.
153
Sensational tales of a malpractice insurance crisis are not a new devel-
opment. 154 The country has previously experienced a malpractice insurance
crisis twice before.' 55 The cyclical nature of the economy caused the crises in
the mid-1970's and mid-1980's and the economy is also the cause of the current
crisis. 156 Throughout the 1990's, the booming economy allowed doctors to en-
joy artificially lower premiums, due to insurers quest for market share.' 57 Then
between 1998 and 2001, paid losses by insurers increased 8.2 percent.'58 The
reason for this sudden swell in payouts is unclear; some have argued that the
increase is because of increased public knowledge of medical errors; reduced
trust in the healthcare system stemming from patients' negative experience with
managed care; higher expectations in medical care; and resistance from plain-
tiffs' attorneys to settle cases. 159 In response to these higher paid losses, mal-
practice insurers began to increase their incurred losses, which are "estimates of
what they expect[] to pay at some point in the future for claims reported in the
current year, as well as what they expect[] to pay for claims still open in previ-
ous years."'' 60 This bleak view of the future led insurance companies to rein-
force their loss reserves by increasing insurance premiums. 161
Malpractice insurance rates charged by insurance companies do not cor-
respond to increases or decreases in payouts, which have been stable for 30
150 See Guglielmo, supra note 11, at 22.
151 PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONG. WATCH, supra note 148 at 6.
152 Id. By contrast, approximately 43,000 die from automobile accidents, 42,000 die from
breast cancer, and 15,000 die from AIDS. Id. at 7.
153 DOMINICK VErRI, Er AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 207 (2003). See also PUBLIC CITIZEN'S
CONG. WATCH, supra note 148, at 9.
154 See Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. 1976) (examining
legislation enacted in response to a medical malpractice crisis); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med.
Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 881 (W.Va. 1991) (examining legislation enacted in response to a medical
malpractice crisis). See also Guglielmo, supra note 11, at 22. "We've had three malpractice
insurance crises to date - one in the 1970s, another in the mid - '80s, and today's." id.
155 Guglielmo, supra note 11, at 22, 25-29.
156 PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONG. WATCH, supra note 148, at 19.
157 Id.
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years. 162 Instead, premiums flux with the state of the economy; insurance pre-
miums increase or decrease in direct correlation to the strength or weakness of
the economy. 163  Premium rates reflect the gains or losses experienced by the
industry's market investments and the industry's perception of how much they
can earn on the investment "float."' 64 Investment float, which is the time be-
tween when premiums are paid to the insurer and when losses are paid out by
the insurer, 165 is how insurance companies earn substantial profits.'
66
Medical malpractice payouts currently account for less than one percent
of the total healthcare costs in the United States. 167 In fact, for the past eighteen
years, malpractice payouts have not exceeded one percent of total Costs. 168 Fur-
thermore, malpractice insurance premiums account for less than one percent of
healthcare costs, as they have for almost twenty years.' 69 These numbers have
remained steady while overall healthcare spending has been increasing at a high
rate.17 0 This data indicates there has not been a recent spike in malpractice pay-
outs that triggered outrageous premiums; this claim is a crucial aspect of the
"crisis" argument. Instead, any "crisis" that exists is more likely the result of
the cyclical nature of the economy.
Although malpractice insurance is frequently cited as the driving force
behind doctors leaving West Virginia and other states experiencing a crisis,
171
there is a variety of other reasons that factor into their decisions. About one-
third of doctors stated that malpractice insurance factored into their decision to
relocate or retire early, but almost every doctor stated it was not the deciding
factor.172 Various doctors feel that West Virginia has a poor economy that is not
162 AMERICANS FOR INSURANCE REFORM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: STABLE LOSSES,
UNSTABLE RATES 1 (Oct. 10, 2002), http://www.insurance-reform.org/StableLosses.pdf (last vis-




166 Interview with Paul T. Farrell, Jr., Wilson, Frame, Benninger, Farrell & Metheney (Jan. 17,
2005).
167 AMERICANS FOR INSURANCE REFORM, THINK MALPRACTICE IS DRIVING UP HEALTH CARE
COSTS? THINK AGAIN., http://www.centerjd.org/air/pr/ARhealthcosts.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2006). In 2002, payouts accounted for 0.38 percent of total healthcare costs. Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. In 2002, malpractice insurance premiums consumed 0.58 percent of total healthcare
expenditures. Id.
170 Marc Leduc, Health Spending in the U.S., http://www.healingdaily.com/conditions/health
-spending.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
171 Telephone Interview with Michael J. Romano, supra note 131. Doctors in several states are
claiming that they have are being forced to leave. Id. If doctors are fleeing a majority of states,
where are they all going? This was a question posed by Mr. Romano. Id.
172 Joy Davia, Greener Pastures: High Malpractice Insurance, Poor Economy Discourage
Many Doctors from Working in W. Va., CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 2002, at P1A [hereinafter
Davia, Greener Pastures]. See also Joy Davia, Doctors Struggle with Different Malpractice
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encouraging to raising a family here. 173 Some doctors included in the statistics
of those who left the state did not move away, but rather were actually de-
ceased.1 74 Other factors identified by doctors are patients who do not follow the
doctor's orders, and the increased amount of paperwork required by HMO's,
Medicare, and Medicaid.175 Many doctors were also losing money or barely
turning a profit due to poor reimbursements from Medicaid. 176 Positions in
other states often pay more, have cheaper overhead, which includes rent, utili-
ties, and malpractice insurance, and there is not an additional tax on doctors.
177
It cannot be denied that doctors in certain specialties are facing substan-
tial malpractice insurance premiums. 178 As the preceding paragraphs show, the
current crisis is not due to frivolous lawsuits, but is instead an attempt by insur-
ance companies to recover their losses after the stock market declined in
2000.179 As states rush to enact legislation to limit noneconomic damages, the
effectiveness of caps to reduce insurance premiums has not been sufficiently
proven.10
B. Caps on Damages Do Not Correlate With Lower Insurance Premiums
The legislation in question in Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical
Center, Inc.181 was the West Virginia Medial Professional Liability Act of
1986.182 It is interesting to note the reasons given for the purpose of the legisla-
tion. The legislature was concerned with ensuring access to quality healthcare
for West Virginia residents. 183 "The legislature found that in recent years the
cost of professional liability insurance for health care providers has risen dra-
matically and that the nature and extent of coverage concomitantly has dimin-
ished, to the detriment of the injured and health care providers.'' From this
Problems: Some See Leaving as Only Alternative, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 7, 2002, at PIA.
In the article, one doctor stated, "[mlalpractice may not directly be the reason why I'm leaving,
but it's definitely a factor." Id.
173 Id.
174 Interview with Michael J. Romano, General Partner, Romano & Miley, in Clarksburg, W.
Va. (Jan. 28, 2005).
175 Davia, Greener Pastures, supra note 172.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 9-14.
179 See Guglielmo, supra note 11, at 24.
180 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 41. The study noted that a cap on
noneconomic damages may decrease insurers' losses. Id.
181 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991).
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reasoning, the $1 million cap on noneconomic damages was enacted. 85 Fifteen
years later, however, the medical community lobbied for reduced caps. This
raises an important question: If the caps were not effective before, why would
they be effective now?
Over the past several years, California's malpractice insurance premi-
ums have tracked the rate of inflation, 186 while other states have endured more
unpredictable premiums. 187 In 1975, California instituted caps on malpractice
awards, which limited the amount of noneconomic damages to $250,000.188
The plan, known as MICRA (Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act), was
created in response to doctors and insurers who claimed that there was an insur-
ance crisis. 189 MICRA was enacted to solve the insurance crisis, and insurance
premiums leveled off for about ten years. 90 Doctors and insurance companies
regularly point to California as evidence that caps are effective in lowering in-
surance premiums.'91 Those who champion the experience of California ignore
a crucial factor affecting its insurance rates. In the mid-1980's, there was a sud-
den and substantial jump in premium rates, despite the existence of California's
cap.' 92 Those increases precipitated Proposition 103 in 1988, which "rolled
back insurance rates for most policyholders, including doctors, froze premiums
and refunded millions of dollars to doctors to compensate for excessive past
premiums. Thereafter, medical malpractice insurance was subject to the na-
tion's toughest rate regulation system in the country .... "'9 Since the passage
of Proposition 103, insurance rates have continued to drop, with less variations
from year to year.' 94
The experiences of California seem to indicate that instituting a cap
alone will not reduce insurance premiums for doctors. In West Virginia, the
insurance companies may claim to be waiting to see if the court upholds the
constitutionality of the 2003 reforms before lowering insurance premiums.
95
However, in California the cap was challenged in 1985,196 but insurance rates
185 Id. at 881-82.
186 See FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, How INSURANCE REFORM
LOWERED DOCTORS' MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES IN CALIFORNIA AND How MALPRACTICE CAPS
FAILED 6 (Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/rp/1008.pdf.
187 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 2.
188 FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, supra note 186, at 2.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 2, 5.
191 Guglielmo, supra note 11, at 28.
192 See FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, supra note 186, at 3, 6.
193 Id. at 2.
194 Id. at 9.
195 Telephone Interview with Don R. Sensabaugh, Jr., supra note 132.
196 See Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 679-84 (Cal. 1985).
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continued to climb even after the constitutionality was upheld. 97 One could
argue that implementing damage caps in West Virginia is not the correct solu-
tion to achieve the goals of maintaining doctors in the state and providing ade-
quate healthcare for its citizens.
Critics of tort reform have frequently cited the absence of any guaran-
tees from the insurance companies as a crucial flaw in reform plans. 98 Joanne
Doroshow, executive director of a non-profit consumer advocacy group, criti-
cized reform bills, stating that "the bills erode patients' rights and leave 'mal-
practicing hospitals, HMOs, nursing homes, doctors and even pharmaceutical
companies off the hook for injuring patients, while doing nothing to control
insurance rates for doctors.""199 One study concluded that there was no correla-
tion between a damage cap and medical malpractice insurance rates, likely be-
cause 0.6 percent of all claims brought are for over $100,000. 200
The justification for caps on noneconomic damages is to reduce the cost
of medical malpractice insurance, which in turn will retain doctors in the state
and strengthen the quality of healthcare available in the state.20' However, the
burden of this type of legislation "falls exclusively on those extremely unfortu-
nate victims" who suffer the most serious and catastrophic injuries.20 2 A jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a limited amount has not received full com-
pensation for their injuries if the legislature statutorily, and arbitrarily, caps the
recovery at a lesser amount than their actual damages.20 3 For those who are
catastrophically injured by medical negligence, it is unreasonable and arbitrary
to limit their recovery in a speculative experiment to determine whether liability
insurance rates will decrease.204 It is inequitable to find that arbitrary caps will
provide a parallel between a victim's actual damages and the amounts
awarded.205  One malpractice insurance company stated that "[n]oneconomic
197 See FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, supra note 186, at 3. In 1986, the
year after the constitutionality of the cap was upheld in Fein, malpractice insurance rates jumped
39.96%. Id.
198 Romano, supra note 36, at 10. See also Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414
S.E.2d 877, 887 (W. Va. 1991).
199 Romano, supra note 36, at 10.
200 Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (citing MICHAEL SUMNER, THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF
HOSPITAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 9 (1979)).
201 See W. VA. HOSPITAL Assoc., supra note 12, at 1.
202 Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. 1976).
203 Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692, (citing Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1088-89 (Fla.
1987)). See also Verba v. Gaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406, 418 (W.Va. 2001) (McGraw, J., dissenting)
(citing Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836-37 (N.H. 1980).
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damages are a small percentage of total losses paid," and that caps on damages




VI. THE CAPS PRESENT A POSSIBLE ACCESS TO COURTS PROBLEM
When the West Virginia Legislature reduced the cap on noneconomic
damages to $250,000, it produced the serious side effect of making it more dif-
ficult for victims of medical malpractice to obtain representation. Several attor-
neys have stated that the caps make it more difficult to take medical malpractice
cases. 20 7  The imposition of caps on noneconomic damages has made filing a
medical malpractice suit less economically sound for plaintiffs' attorneys.2 8
The cost of hiring experts to testify in malpractices cases can cost as much as
$10 0 ,0 0 0 ,20
9 and when the contingency fee is deducted from any possible
award,21° the amount of recovery for the client may not even approach what his
or her true losses are.2 1' This has discouraged attorneys from representing vic-
212tims of medical malpractice. Plaintiffs' attorneys regularly have to invest
$50,000 to $100,000 out of pocket to try a malpractice case, and unless the at-
torney wins, he or she loses that money.21 3 Additionally, receiving a verdict for
the plaintiff in medical malpractice cases has become increasingly difficult, pos-
sibly because juries have been "poisoned" by the constant media barrage pitting
doctors against lawyers.214
206 Joseph T. Hallinan & Rachel Zimmerman, Malpractice Insurer Sees Little Savings in Award
Caps, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2004, at A6.
207 Telephone Interview with Gary Wigal, Partner, Gianola, Barnum & Wigal (Dec. 16, 2004);
Telephone Interview with Michael J. Romano, supra note 131; Interview with Paul T. Farrell, Jr.,
supra note 26; Telephone Interview with William S. Druckman, supra note 131.
208 Id.
209 Telephone Interview with Gary Wigal, supra note 207; Interview with Michael J. Romano,
supra note 131.
210 Telephone Interview with Gary Wigal, supra note 207. Although the cap limits damages at
$250,000, a jury verdict could be for an amount less than that which further reduces their recov-
ery. Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.; Telephone Interview with Michael J. Romano, supra note 131; Interview with Paul T.
Farrell, Jr., supra note 26; Telephone Interview with William S. Druckman, supra note 131.
213 Telephone Interview with William S. Druckman, supra note 131. See also Terry, infra note
216. Lawyers may be less inclined to take cases with low damages even when the liability is
clear. "'If a jury returns a verdict of $75,000, and the plaintiff has medical bills of $40,000, there
is no way the client would get any money,' . . . '[o]nce you pay the experts and pay back the
health insurer, there is nothing left for the client let alone the lawyer, so really there is no legal
remedy for small cases[.]"' Id.
214 Id.; Telephone Interview with James Bordas, III, supra note 133.
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Because the 2003 legislation is still relatively new, the full effects have
not yet been realized.215 It is evident, however, that the cap has reduced the
number of medical malpractice cases that are being filed. The following chart
demonstrates the effect that the cap has had throughout West Virginia.216
County 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Barbour 0 1 0 0
Berkeley 6 9 2 1
Boone 0 1 1 0
Braxton 0 0 1 0
Brooke 5 7 1 0
Cabell 29 28 15 1
Calhoun 0 0 0 0
Clay 1 0 0 0
Doddridge 0 0 0 0
Fayette 1 5 0 0
Gilmer 1 0 0 0
Grant 4 2 0 0
Greenbrier 5 7 3 0
Hampshire 0 1 1 0
Hancock 0 1 2 0
Hardy 0 1 1 0
Harrison 2 14 6 0
Jackson 1 1 1 0
Jefferson 1 2 1 0
Kanawha 70 66 20 2
Lewis 2 2 4 0
Lincoln 0 0 0 0
Logan 15 10 4 0
Marion 0 2 0 0
Marshall 4 6 2 0
Mason 8 2 1 0
McDowell 3 3 1 0
Mercer 8 17 9 0
215 Interview with Paul T. Farrell, Jr., supra note 26. Many of the cases currently being liti-
gated and settled are ones filed before the caps went into effect. Id.
216 Juliet A. Terry, Med Mal Lawsuit Filings Decrease, THE STATE JOURNAL 15, Mar. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.statejoumal.com/story.cfm?func=viewstory&storyid=1628 ("The West
Virginia State Treasurer's Office uses an increased filing fee to track how many medical malprac-
tice lawsuits are filed in West Virginia each year. The filing fee for those cases was increased to
$165 in December 2001. The number of filings increased in 2003, the last year for any medical
liability reform, and then dropped off by more than half in 2004. The number of cases filed does
not distinguish whether the lawsuit was filed against a physician or hospital.").
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Mineral 0 0 0 0
Mingo 4 4 2 1
Monongalia 17 31 7 1
Monroe 0 0 0 0
Morgan 0 1 1 0
Nicholas 0 4 1 0
Ohio 15 20 7 0
Pendleton 0 0 0 0
Pleasants 0 0 0 0
Pocahontas 0 0 0 0
Preston 2 1 0 0
Putnam 4 20 10 59
Raleigh 13 21 6 0
Randolph 2 3 3 0
Ritchie 0 0 0 0
Roane 2 0 0 0
Summers 0 0 1 0
Taylor 0 1 3 0
Tucker 0 1 0 0
Tyler 1 1 0 0
Upshur 1 2 1 0
Wayne 0 1 0 0
Webster 0 0 0 0
Wetzel 3 2 1 0
Wirt 0 0 0 0
Wood 9 14 11 1
Wyoming 0 0 0 0
Total 239 315 130 66
* ne numoers for
217
tion.
2005 are January only; see rootnoe ior explana-
Because the new law went into effect on July 1, 2003, there was a rush
to file medical malpractice cases before the deadline so the $1,000,000 cap
would apply. 18 The numbers for 2003 are skewed because of this rush to file
cases under the old law. Comparing the data from 2002 and 2004 illustrates
that, for most West Virginia counties, the number of cases filed decreased. For
217 It is important to note that the figures for 2005 are for January only. While it appears from
the data that the numbers of malpractice suits are on the rise, a proliferation of lawsuits against
one doctor skewed the statistics. Of the 66 cases filed during January 2005, "59 of them are in
Putnam County Circuit Court, where many lawsuits have been filed against Dr. John Anderson
King, the former orthopedic surgeon at Putnam General Hospital who is accused of providing
substandard care during his seven-month stint at the hospital in 2003." Id.
218 Interview with Paul T. Farrell, Jr., supra note 26.
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example, in 2002, Monongalia County had seventeen malpractice filings. 219 By
2004, that number had dropped to seven.220 Similarly, in Kanawha County, the
2002 number was at 70, while in 2004 it had dropped by more than two-thirds,
to 20. Some would view this data as evidence that malpractice caps are achiev-
ing their goal of reducing frivolous lawsuits.2 2' Others would interpret the data
that caps are denying malpractice victims their day in court.222 This second sce-
nario seems more probable, given the fact that potential plaintiffs were required
to file a certificate of merit to filter non-meritorious claims even before the 2003
reforms were enacted.
In 2003, the Texas Legislature adopted a $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages, which is similar to Section 55-7B-8 enacted in West Virginia.
223 Vic-
tims of medical malpractice in Texas are experiencing difficulty finding attor-
neys to take their cases.224 The reforms in Texas "slammed the courthouse
doors shut on those who can least afford it - children, stay-at-home moms and
the elderly. 225 One lawyer noted that since the reforms became effective, her
firm has taken just two new medical malpractice cases, whereas the firm nor-
mally would have taken 30 to 40 cases over the same time period.226 Another
firm has been screening hundreds of malpractice cases but has yet to file one.227
Whether or not tort reform is working is still being debated.228 Some lawyers
argue that one malpractice insurance carrier has reduced premiums 17 percent,
doctors in high-risk specialties are increasing, and Texas has become an attrac-
219 Terry, supra note 216, at 15.
220 Id. The numbers for 2003 were skewed because of the reforms taking effect on July 1,
2003. Before the cap went into effect, there were 26 malpractice cases filed, and only four after-
wards.
221 Telephone Interview with Don R. Sensabaugh, Jr., supra note 132.
222 Donald, supra note 24. See also Terry, supra note 216, at 15. West Virginia Trial Lawyers
Association lobbyist Jim Casey argues the decline in suits filed is not related to a decline in non-
meritorious suits. Rather, "'[pleople are now turning away what once was or would have been a
valid claim because the risk of going to trial and being unsuccessful have increased dramatically
because of the cost involved[.]'" Id.
223 Compare TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. § 74.301 (2005) (establishing a $250,000 cap on none-
conomic damages, limiting all claimants to a total of $250,000 regardless of the number of defen-
dants, and extending the cap to $500,000 when more than one health care institution is involved),
with W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 2005) (establishing a $250,000 cap on noneconomic dam-
ages, limiting all claimants to $250,000 regardless of the number of defendants, and extending the
cap to $500,000 for instances of wrongful death, loss of limb, or bodily organ system, or perma-
nent physical or mental injury that prevents an injured person from caring for himself for herself).
224 See Donald, supra note 24.
225 I.
226 Id. Note that the numbers represent an approximate time period of sixteen months. The
reforms in Texas became effective on September 1, 2003, and the article by Mark Donald was
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tive place to practice medicine. 229 Others remark that another malpractice insur-
ance carrier requested a 39 percent increase in 2004 and argue that the cap effec-
tively denies victims a remedy for their loss. 230 This reflects the opinions and
experiences of attorneys here in West Virginia.23'
The issue of whether Section 55-7B-8 acts as a barrier to justice will
likely be raised if and when the constitutionality of the provision is challenged.
The West Virginia Constitution, through the certain remedy provision, guaran-
tees that its citizens will have access to the state's courts. 232 "This state constitu-
tional provision has sometimes been called the 'open courts' or 'access-to-
,,233 ipiae
courts' provision. Legislation implicates the certain remedy provision if it
substantially limits procedural remedies permitting judicial adjudication of
cases. 234 In Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals examined the constitutionally of legislation that was chal-
235lenged under the certain remedy provision.  Lewis argued that the West Vir-
ginia Skiing Responsibility Act, which absolved ski area operators from liability
under certain conditions,236 infringed on his ability to gain access to court.237
Because, as the court reasoned, access to court is not a fundamental
right, any legislation that impairs that right will not be examined under strict
238scrutiny. Instead, once the certain remedy provision is implicated, the court
will use a two-part test. 239 The legislation will be upheld if either (1) "a rea-
sonably effective alternative remedy is provided by the legislation," or (2) if no
alternate remedy is provided, then the purpose of limiting or modifying the
cause of action or remedy must be to "eliminate or curtail a clear social or eco-
nomic problem[.],, 240 Additionally, limiting or modifying the cause of action or
241remedy must be a reasonable method of achieving such purpose.
229 Id.
230 Id. Medical Protective Co. requested a 39 percent increase in rates, stating that capping
noneconomic damages will reduce losses by 1.0 percent.
231 See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
232 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17.
233 Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 634, 644 n.13 (W. Va. 1991).
234 Id. at 644.
235 Id. at 644-46. The West Virginia Legislature enacted § 20-3A-1, the Skiing Responsibility
Act. The Act stated that skiers assumed the risks that are inherent to the sport of skiing and are
virtually impossible to eliminate. Id. The Act excused ski area operators from liability in certain
instances. Id. at 638.
236 W. VA. CODE § 20-3A-6 (2004).
237 See Lewis, 408 S.E.2d at 644.
238 Id.
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In the context of medical malpractice reform, Section 55-7B-8 does not
provide a reasonably effective alternative remedy for victims of medical mal-
practice. 242 Therefore, Section 55-7B-8 should be unconstitutional unless it can
be redeemed under the second prong of the two-part test. The Legislature en-
acted the reforms to maintain doctors in the state and ensure that West Virginia
citizens have access to quality healthcare.243 In doing so, they were aiming to
eliminate the social and economic problem of West Virginia as an unattractive
place to practice medicine because of its malpractice insurance premiums and
frivolous lawsuits, which in turn places its citizens at a healthcare disadvan-
tage.244 Section 55-7B-8 may still be unconstitutional, however, because limit-
ing an individual's right to file a claim against a healthcare provider has little
effect on malpractice insurance rates.245 In determining damage caps' constitu-
tionality, courts should carefully examine the factors affecting malpractice in-
surance rates, and then determine whether capping damages is rationally related
to controlling those rates. If courts look closely at the facts, they will likely




As calls for medical malpractice reform intensify throughout the coun-
try, a solid look at the facts, and not the hype, underlying malpractice insurance
rates and healthcare in a given region is vital. Several factors affect malpractice
insurance rates, including actions and business practices of insurance compa-
nies, yet the focus of tort reform has centered on capping noneconomic dam-
ages. Ironically, studies have shown that the impact of these damage caps on
noneconomic damages do not significantly affect doctors' malpractice insurance
premiums. "'Band-Aid solutions, such as a sole focus on tort reform, have not
worked in the past, and they won't work now[.]'
' 247
Establishing reforms without careful consideration of the facts can se-
verely limit citizens' rights guaranteed to them in the Constitution. In West
Virginia, the cap has had the effect of singling out medical malpractice victims
for differential treatment, and it resonates with unfairness. Those with substan-
tial damages may be denied a full recovery if their damages are purely none-
conomic. Additionally, they may be denied any recovery because of the diffi-
242 See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8.
243 See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1.
244 See id.
245 See supra notes 145-207 and accompanying text.
246 See Oliverio, supra note 28, at 542.
247 See Wayne J. Guglielmo, Behind the med-mal crisis; A Medical Economics Special Investi-
gation, 82 MED. ECON. 20 (2005).
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culty in securing an attorney to take their case. Those individuals are suffering
the consequences of tort reform; those reforms are unlikely to have a significant
impact on lessening the cost of malpractice insurance rates, which is the purpose
of the reforms. Because of that negligible impact, one could argue that the leg-
islation is not rationally related to achieving those goals, and therefore it fails
rational basis review. Courts and legislators should carefully examine whether
establishing caps on noneconomic damages will truly achieve the goals of the
legislation, and they should further consider the impact damage caps inflict on
victims' rights. The realization will likely be that the rights seized from medical
malpractice victims do not justify the possible benefits.
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